Yacyretá Project Activity Timeline

9 January 2004

2003:

• In February, claimants have been waiting for over 10 months to hear from the IDB on the second investigation request. While the World Bank Inspection Mechanism moves ahead with a second investigation, the IDB still does not act.
  

2002:

• On May 17, on behalf of 4,000 families, the Federation of the People of Itapua and Misiones Affected by Yacyretá (FEDAYIM) file a second claim with the IDB and World Bank's respective inspection mechanisms for violations of six Bank policies in the Yacyretá project. The claim cites continued severe environmental degradation, adverse health impacts caused by the elevation of the reservoir, and insufficient compensation programs, and requests further investigation.
• The World Bank Inspection Panel conducts a preliminary assessment of the claim and, on September 20, approves FEDAYIM's request for a full inspection.
• After months of silence, the IIM Coordinator at the IDB finally acknowledges the second request for review, only to disagree that the claim is the result of IDB mis-action. Claimants still await approval of a second inspection.
  

1999:

• Despite recognizing the need for more extensive participation in designing and executing mitigation and resettlement measures, neither the World Bank nor the IDB take action. Individuals from World Bank management, however, communicate a commitment to improving citizen participation and execution of mitigation efforts. IDB managers make no similar verbal commitment.
  

1998:

• A March 20 letter published in the Paraguayan newspaper Ultima Hora from Isabel Guerrero, the World Bank Acting Vice President for Latin America, completely contradicts the findings of the Panel's report, stating instead that the Bank is satisfied that the Yacyretá project complies with all Bank policies.
• This letter's publication touches off a string of letters from the Paraguayan NGO Sobrevivencia, and supporting NGOs from around the world, to Bank officials demanding a public retraction of the letter in the Paraguayan press and asking that the Panel's report and accompanying Action Plan be translated and made publicly available to affected populations.
• In May, World Bank managers finally meet with members of Encarnación, a reservoir-flooded Paraguayan town. However, their message is vague and contradictory regarding the progress in identifying solutions to residents' concerns.
• Public outrage, protests and hunger strikes in Argentina and Paraguay, and mounting international pressure from the NGO community finally win Sobrevivencia a face-to-face meeting with World Bank President James Wolfensohn, who apologizes for the way the Panel's report had been handled and personally promises immediate translation and availability of the Panel's report and Action Plan. IDB President Enrique Iglesias makes no similar apology or promise.
• Wolfensohn's promise leads to a site visit by World Bank Vice President Burki in June, where he discovers that the social and environmental impacts are even greater than previously thought, with thousands of displaced people still without any compensation and living in extreme poverty.
  

1997:

• Both IDB and World Bank independent inspection bodies deliver a final report confirming violation of the loan agreements on numerous charges, calling for additional action on the part of the banks to resolve inadequate resettlement, compensation and environmental mitigation measures. However, controversy within the boards over the profound political implications of releasing and acting on the panels' report leads to a stalemate, and final decisions about how to act are postponed.
  

1996:

• In September, on behalf of affected populations, Sobrevivencia/ Friends of the Earth Paraguay file requests for independent investigation of Yacyretá by the World Bank Inspection Panel and IDB Independent Inspection Mechanism. The claim cites widespread health, economic and environmental concerns, inaccurate assessment of the size of the affected population, insufficient participation of those in resettlement programs, a lack of alternative sources of employment for affected populations, and long delays in the land retitlement program.
• In December, World Bank and IDB inspection panel members conduct a preliminary field visit to Paraguay and Argentina, conclude that the project appears to be in violation of the most recent loan agreements, and recommend to the Board a full investigation.
• After several months of deliberation by Board members, the World Bank and IDB authorize a full review of the claims by their respective investigative mechanisms.
  

1994:

• 
  In August, with project completion still lagging, project sponsors decide to close the spillways and flood the valley to its first incremental level of 76 meters above sea level. Compensation and resettlement programs are not in place, hydrogeologic studies are not complete, hundreds of families are immediately displaced and thousands more affected. Although the action is in clear violation of the loan agreements, neither the World Bank nor the IDB intervene.
  

1993:

• 
  In July, the IDB approves a loan for $130 million to the Yacyretá project, bringing direct IDB financing of the project to at least $840 million (again, not including millions more in redirected funds from other loans).
  

1992:

• The World Bank approves a loan for $300 million, bringing direct World Bank financing of the project to at least $800 million (not including millions more in redirected funds from other loans).
• At this point, dam and support infrastructure construction is 85% complete, while the "complementary works" - including housing for displaced people, parks, schools, sewage treatment facilities and other environmental mitigation measures - are only 15% complete.
  

1991:

• The World Bank and the IDB begin preparing another set of loans for Yacyretá under new bank lending policies, for the first time requiring environmental and social impact studies and corresponding mitigation measures, relocation programs and public participation of affected populations.
  

1983-1991:

• Construction begins and is delayed/stalled numerous times due to disputes, corruption, regime changes in Argentina and Paraguay, unpredicted engineering setbacks, and insufficient environmental studies.
  " As the project continues to overrun its initial projected budget, the World Bank and IDB refinance it several times.
  

1973:

• Argentina and Paraguay sign initial treaty authorizing the Yacyretá project.