9 September 2009
Recent evidence suggests that there will be irreversible loss of up to 85% of the Amazon forests by 2100. Still, the prospect of Amazon die-back remains a somewhat misunderstood threat due to perceived uncertainty with the climate models, but also because of the lack of visibility by development institutions.
Amazon Dieback
By Vincent McElhinny and Christian Velasquez-Donaldson
Latin America contributes 6 percent of global emissions from the energy sector and 12 percent of all global emissions if we include deforestation and land use change. The share of the region in global emissions is very modest, but the region is already facing profoundly negative impacts with heavy economic and the social consequences. For example, the melting of tropical glaciers in the Andean region is leading to water scarcity and less hydropower availability, upon which the Andean countries are highly dependent. In Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, dependence on hydropower energy coming from the Andes is 50, 68 and 70 percent respectively. In terms of water supply, more than 77 million people are expected face water shortage by 2020.[1]
Among other impacts is the bleaching of coral reefs that threatens the ecosystem of the ocean in the Caribbean, as well as aquifer salinization and wetland loss in Mexico, hurricane intensification, etc. The list is long, but one of the most devastating impacts, not only for Latin America but worldwide, will be the risk of an Amazon dieback or savannization.
The Amazon represents one of three primary feedback loops that help regulate global climate stability through crucial ecosystem services such as the recycling of rainfall and the capture of carbon. Reaching a “tipping point” of irreversible damage to any of these three feedback loops is viewed by climate scientists as the trigger for the most catastrophic scenarios. The collapse of the Amazon rainforest, as recent IPCC research has explained, would unleash a chain of events that would result not only in disaster for the environment and economy of South America, but contribute to the lethal accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere globally.[2] Of the 20 IPCC general circulation models, the evidence suggests that regional temperature increases of 5 to 7 degrees Fahrenheit would result in irreversible loss of as much as 85% of the Amazon forests by 2100. Still, the prospect of Amazon die-back remains a somewhat misunderstood threat due to perceived uncertainty with the climate models (vegetation, soil moisture,), but also due to the lack of visibility by development institutions.
In light of this potentially high risk of an Amazon dieback, the Latin America and Caribbean Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Department (LCSES) – “Climate Change Group” of the World Bank is studying the possible implications of climate change on the integrity of the Amazon basin, focusing on tracing factors for low soil moisture, negative feedback loops (rainfall, deforestation) and increased vulnerability to fire. The results are being reviewed and will only be available later after a peer review is completed.
In November 2008, the Amazon die-back study was cited as a key input into the design and implementation of a $1.3 billion environmental development policy loan by the World Bank to fund various actions by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). This SEM DPL has a significant climate orientation, which among other goals, supports the implementation of the Brazilian climate action plan. However, in the final draft of the SEM DPL prior to approval of the first tranche in March 2009, references to the Amazon die-back study were removed from the loan, which raises several concerns regarding the Bank failing to incorporate pertinent research into the design of its operations.
BNDES is the major financing institution for the Madeira Hydroelectric Complex, and the DPL includes among other goals, support for BNDES to develop a social and environmental policy to better screen and analyze project risk. The SEM DPL loan also supports the formulation of sub-sector investment guidelines for the energy sector, including hydroelectric energy. The decision by the Bank to move forward quickly with the DPL (lacking full transparency) without incorporating results from the die-back study seem to represent a lack of coherence regarding overall strategy on climate.[3]
Global and Local Causes of Amazon Dieback
The World Bank's analysis of the probability of Amazon die-back attempts to integrate the various IPCC climate models and reduce uncertainty regarding the timing and cause. The risk analysis of the Amazon die-back relies on the Earth Simulator data for end-of-century climate in the basin, a probability density function for rainfall in the Amazon basin, carbon dioxide concentration and the assessment of biomass response to these changes through the application of the LPJ model (carbon-water-vegetation-roll dynamic model).[4] Preliminary conclusions indicate that the Amazon die-back is mostly caused by global green house emissions (the world’s two largest emitters are the United States and China) as well and other developed countries; therefore, it is not related to Latin America’s own GHG emissions. Deforestation and land use trends also have the significant, although secondary potential to exacerbate this mainly global climate change induced process.
The increasing temperatures and the disruption of the rainfall in the Amazon are damaging the basin capacity to retain moisture, which in turn affects transpiration, changing rainfall patterns and making vegetation more susceptible to forest fire. This situation reduces the capacity of the Amazon basin to retain carbon, which in turn contributes to the problem of climate change by accelerating global warming and becoming an irreversible and vicious feedback loop.
However, the environmental costs are not the only worry. As suggested above, there are as yet uncalculated social and economic costs related to these findings. Human activities and environmental services that provide for the livelihoods of rural populations and indigenous groups are at stake in this grim scenario. The poor and most vulnerable are the ones that are the least responsible for causing the problem and the ones with least resources to adapt.
Even though these preliminary conclusions to some extent are pointing to industrialized countries as the main cause of the Amazon die-back due to their proportion of global GHG emission, Latin America and especially Brazil’s participation is extremely important for the sustainability of the Amazon given the land-use changes and the rate of deforestation in Brazil that makes it the world’s fourth largest producer of GHG emissions.
The cattle sector in Brazil is the leading driver for deforestation in the Amazon responsible for about 80% of all deforestation in Brazil. According to Greenpeace, deforestation from 1996-2005 accounted for the loss of more than 19.5 million hectares with annual emission of 716Mt CO2, which is equal to the combined annual emissions from coal consumption of Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, France, The Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, according to a Greenpeace report, more than 70 million hectares, which represent almost 20 percent of the Brazilian Amazon, were already cleared by 2008.[5]
Land tenure laws in Brazil feed deforestation by allowing colonizers or land grabbers to gain titles by clearing forest and place cattle on the land. According to Greenpeace, a set of laws passed by the Brazilian Congress this year legalizes property rights for illegally occupied land and in addition, doubles the percentage of forest that can be cleared legally within a property. The new land regulations and the promotion of settlements in environmentally fragile forest areas without economic viability undermine the recovery of degraded and deforested areas.[6]
Road construction in the Amazon represents the entryway to previously inaccessible lands, not only physically but also by reducing transport cost of merchandise, which represent a major constraint for the expansion of agro-industry and livestock.[7] This is especially true when infrastructure development through initiatives like IIRSA or the PAC lack coherent planning that adequately accounts for the social and environmental impacts that could undermine sustainability. A recent cost-benefit analysis of the proposed BR-319 highway between Porto Velho and Manaus calculates the full costs of deforestation and indicates that the social and environmental programs necessary to ensure the sustainability of the highway would likely cost the same amount as the paving itself (about $430 million) – an added expense that Brazilian transport ministry has indicated it will not pay.[8]
Hydroelectric dams, such as the Madeira Complex or Belo Monte appear to be politically motivated regardless of any objective assessment of the sustainability of the Amazon. In contradiction to several studies raising important concerns about the significant negative impacts of the Madeira Complex[9], at a recent public hearing at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington D.C. the Brazilian Minister of Mines and Energy, Edison Lobao said that “there are zero impacts” related to San Antonio and Jirau dams.
It is not a secret that in promoting cheap and clean energy Brazil is pushing a ten year energy strategy that prioritizes the construction of more than 80 dams in the Amazon to fulfill its growing demand for energy. Altino Ventura Filho, the head of energy planning of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, recently stated, “Plans for Brazil’s energy future are based on hydroelectricity from the Amazon. We are going to build all the dams we can, this given the current legislation, and then we will revisit the other potential dam sites that would impact indigenous lands and protected areas and see how we can exploit those as well.” These declarations raise major concerns given that most Amazonian dams are considered the dirtiest in terms of emissions. There are estimations for Balbina, for instance, concluding that this dam “emits ten times more GHG from rotting vegetation in its reservoir than a coal-fired plant of the same capacity.”[10] Together with the indirect impacts of uncontrolled migration, loss of riverine livelihoods and exacerbated land use problems, all of these infrastructure mega-projects have the real potential to drastically accelerate the Amazon die-back process.
One of the major challenges not only for Brazil but the region is to identify and implement strategies to address the major economic drivers for deforestation in the Amazon. Therefore, it is important to understand that a change in behavior is needed even though it is a slow process. In this regard, a good starting point in the international arena would be for the U.S. and China to commit to the Kyoto Protocol, which would be a victory in Copenhagen in December 2009 that should initiate a major commitment for reduction of GHG emissions.
On the other hand, climate change is an immediate and serious problem that demands shared global action. For Latin America, a redirection of its development policy that prioritizes sustainability over growth and promotes low carbon strategies without undermining energy access for the poor and energy efficiency is of significant importance.
At the height of the Doha Round negotiations, the World Bank boldly pronounced its opposition to the persistence of agricultural subsidies by the U.S. and European governments as an unjustifiable obstacle to free trade and the successful conclusion to a global trade agreement. In the debate on global climate strategy, similar leadership is needed. This kind of leadership by the Bank should begin by providing access to relevant information like the Amazon Die-back Report as an urgent priority in the run up to Copenhagen, not only for ensuring the quality of its own environmental operations (such as the DPL for BNDES) but also to inform the international debate about the causes of global climate change and shared responsibilities in combating it.
[1] De la Torre, Augusto; Fajnzylber, Pablo & Nash, John (2009). Low Carbon, High Growth: Latin American Responses to Climate Change. Overview. World Bank.
[2] P.M. Cox, R.A. Betts, M. Collins, P.P.Harris, C. Huntingford, and C.D. Jones (2004) “Amazonian forest dieback under climate-carbon cycle projections for the 21st century,” Theoretical Applied Climatology 78, 137-156; Yadvinder Malhi and Oliver Phillips (2005) Tropical Forests and Global Atmospheric Change. Cambridge: Oxford University Press;
[3] According to “Development and Climate Change: A Strategic Framework for the World Bank”, the Bank is planning to expand its support for all sizes of hydropower projects from 40 to 50 percent in fiscal year 2011.
[4] Vergara, Walter (2009). Climate Hotspots: Climate-Induce Ecosystem Damage in Latin America. In Walter Vergara (Eds.): Assessing the Potential Consequences of Climate Destabilization in Latin America (pp. 5-17) LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 32. World Bank.
[5] Greenpeace (2009). Slaughtering the Amazon.
[6] Amigos da Terra-Amazonia Brasileira (2009). “Time to pay the Bill: the current situation of cattle ranching in the Amazon”
[7] Maria del Carmen Vera Diaz, Robert K. Kaufmann, and Daniel C. Nepstad (May 2009) The Environmental Impacts of Soybean Expansion and Infrastructure Development in Brazil’s Amazon Basin. Tufts University – Global Development and Environment Institute. Working Paper No. 09-05.
[8] Leonardo Fleck (Maio 2009) Eficiencia economica, riscos e custos ambientais da reconstrucao da rodovia BR 319. Conservation Strategy Fund.
[9] For more details on the concerns, news, and analysis of the Madeira Complex: /es/Project.10138.aspx
[10] Switkes, Glenn (2009). Amazon Peril: Dams Threaten Rainforest Biodiversity. World Rivers Review.
Vol. 24/No.2. International Rivers.