4 March 2004
By Bank Information Center (BIC)
NGO Forum on ADB
Environmental Defense
Centre for Organisation Research & Education (CORE)
Oxfam Community Aid Abroad
March 2004
Problem Statement
The ADB has acknowledged the benefits of ensuring transparency in its activities, stating that “increased transparency can lead to improved project quality and sustainability as well as enhanced public support for the Bank.” [note 1] Access to timely information allows communities to participate in the design and implementation of projects and policies that affect their day-to-day lives. The informed participation of affected groups also enhances the ADB’s overall development effectiveness. Furthermore, transparency is essential to ensuring good governance in the ADB’s operations, a reform which the ADB expects of its developing member countries as well.
In practice, the ADB does not release detailed project information until after final decisions are made. With regards to private sector loans, the ADB often does not release any detailed information, even after project approval. When information is released, generally it is not translated into local languages, making it inaccessible to project affected communities. In addition, ADB governance is very secretive. ADB Board meetings are closed to the public. Transcripts and summaries of board meetings are not disclosed, nor are the votes of the Executive Directors.
Although the ADB claims that its transparency standards are grounded in a “presumption in favor of disclosure,” the frustrating and often fruitless experience of organizations and individuals attempting to access information from the ADB has demonstrated that this presumption is far from being translated into actual practice. The following case studies illustrate this difference between rhetoric versus reality.
Case Study Example – Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project, Pakistan
When communities affected by the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project in Pakistan requested a project consultant’s report on induced flooding and the resettlement plan, they were told the report could not be disclosed because it is considered property of the Government of Pakistan (GoP). ADB staff did not commit to making a request to the GoP to make this document publicly available. Eventually the communities received the report through an informal channel and discovered that consultations with NGOs and local affected communities were part of the Terms of References (TORs) for the development of the very report they had requested.
In addition, ADB staff failed to share project-related information with affected communities prior to a Multi-stakeholders Dialogue Workshop held in March 2002. Affected communities believe ADB staff misinformed them at this workshop in regards to supplementary financing for the project. ADB staff claimed that additional funding for the project in 1999 was not made through a separate loan, though it was. NGOs supporting the efforts of the affected communities speculate that this was an attempt by ADB staff to prevent having to do a full reappraisal of the project as is required in the bank’s policy on supplementary financing.
Case Study Example – Tree Plantation for Livelihood Improvement Project, Lao PDR
The ADB is currently planning phase II of its Tree Plantation for Livelihood Improvement Project in Lao PDR through a TA. According to the ADB’s Project Profile the objective of the TA is to identify a project that will improve livelihoods of the rural population through tree plantation. Unfortunately, beyond the Project Profile, which consists of a brief two-page description of basic project data, there is little information on the proposed project. In March 2003, when Oxfam Mekong Initiative (OMI) requested additional documents related to the project, a Senior Project Economist at the ADB stated that "The draft reports produced so far are not ready for public distribution and will only be available after Board approval." Denial of information early in the project cycle negates external actors’ ability to meaningfully participate in project development and therefore limits the potential poverty-reduction effectiveness of the project.
Furthermore, the ADB has been reluctant to release information about phase I of the project even after Board approval. Under phase I of the project, ADB consultants produced a study entitled Current Constraints Affecting State and Private Investments in Industrial Tree Plantations in the Lao PDR. The consultant's recommendations, if carried out, would involve changes to the forestry law and changes to local environments. However, the report is not available to the public because, according to a project officer at the ADB, the report is an official document and the Bank requires the permission of the Lao government to release it.
Case Study Example – Southern Transport Development Project, Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka the ADB is financing the Southern Transport Development Project, also known as the Colombo - Matara Expressway, which is intended to improve access from the city of Colombo to the southern region of the country. The Executing agency for this project, the Road Development Authority (RDA) had earlier designed a road, referred to as the Original Trace (OT), which was subsequently altered to incorporate recommendations from an ADB consultant who had recommended a trace closer to the coast. This compromise trace became known as the Combined Trace (CT). Environmental and Social Impact studies were done for the CT in 1996, and the ADB Board’s approval of the project in 1999 was based on these assessments.
However, in July 1999 the Central Environmental Authority of Sri Lanka told the RDA to revert to the OT in the Northern section of the road and requested wetland areas be avoided in the Southern part of the Road. The RDA did not revert to the OT but instead created a new trace, now referred to as the Final Trace (FT). Neither the ADB nor the government of Sri Lanka made an adequate attempt to notify the public of the change in the road trace. Some of the communities living in the area of the FT were not informed until February 2001, though the RDA had known since July 1999 that they would be affected. Others found out by coincidence in April 2001 when a resident of one of the affected communities asked the Road Development Authority for permission to build a boundary wall and was informed that his house and 77 others would be demolished due to the road construction. Furthermore, given that neither environmental nor social assessments have been conducted of the FT, the Sri Lankan government and the ADB have failed to involve affected communities in the planning and implementation of the project.
These are but a few examples of ADB non-disclosure. Others can be found amongst the comments submitted regarding the ADB Information Disclosure related policies that are currently posted on the ADB’s website.
Proposed Reforms
[note 2]
As a publicly funded institution the ADB must open its decision-making processes to public scrutiny and make key information available in a timely manner before final decisions are taken. We call on donors to press for greater transparency at the ADB by promoting the following reforms:
- ADB should maintain a “presumption in favor of disclosure” in the proposed new Information Disclosure Policy and take steps toward mainstreaming this presumption in its operations.
- All key documents related to a project, program or policy decision that the Board will make should be released to the public prior to Board consideration.
- ADB should ensure that affected communities have access to information at all stages of the project cycle. During project preparation, ADB should disclose back-to-office reports or memos that track development of the project, draft Report and Recommendation of the President (RRP) documents, project assessments (i.e. EIAs, ISAs) and any resettlement and indigenous peoples plans that are developed. During implementation ADB should disclose loan agreements and any project review and supervision reports. ADB should continue its practice of disclosing project completion reports for public sector operations, and should disclose draft OED reports for comment before they are finalized.
- ADB should make Board documents (Summaries, Transcripts, Minutes) publicly available at a reasonable interval, after such meetings are held. A record of voting should be kept and disclosed.
- ADB should open its Board of Directors’ meetings to the public or make them accessible through television or webcast. The Board should disclose a six month work plan and monthly calendar that lists the Board’s agenda.
- ADB should publicly disclose a list of policies and strategies it expects to review in the coming 12 – 24 months, and as the review approaches, should release information on the review process and how external stakeholders can participate.
- ADB should develop a translation strategy that requires the translation of basic information related to the institution (i.e. policies and sector strategies) into a range of international languages, country specific information (i.e. country strategies) into national languages, and project information into national languages and, where necessary, into local languages of affected communities
- ADB should develop appeal & compliance procedures to offer redress to those wrongfully (i.e. in violation of Disclosure Policy) denied information and documents
- ADB should create/strengthen mechanisms for information dissemination at the country level using its Resident Missions
Notes
- Confidentiality and Disclosure of Information Policy, ADB, 1994
- These recommendations are drawn from, and explained in greater detail, in An Analysis of ADB Transparency: Comments for the Ongoing Disclosure Policy Review, submitted by the Bank Information Center to the ADB in November 2003. These comments can be viewed at http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/BIC_ADB%20Analysis_Nov03.pdf