14 February 2007
Summary and analysis of the IDB annual Civil Society Consultation held in Costa Rica on February 7, 2007.
For the seventh consecutive year, the IDB has invited civil society leaders to discuss topics of mutual interest. The 2007 encounter was limited to a one-day meeting in San José, Costa Rica on February 7, 2007. Among those who listened to President Moreno discuss the significance of the Bank's relationship with civil society since the last meeting in Campinas, Brazil in 2006, some of the 64 people who attended this year qualified the San José meeting as a step backwards in this relationship. Both the IDB and civil society maintain their respective interest in deepened engagement, yet 2007 was disappointing as a missed opportunity. Profound questions exist about the value added of future meetings unless structural changes are considered.
Content of the Panels
Parallel panels were organized on two themes: 1) infrastructure and environment, and 2) participation, indigenous policy, transparency and corruption. The first panel failed to live up to expectations and made poor use of the time available. In particular, many with experience were disappointed that past civil society advice seemed not to have been taken into account.
Janine Ferretti, the IDB environmental division chief, framed the discussion about infrastructure and sustainability as one of inevitable conflict that is likely to be avoided to the extent that the Bank shifts it approach from one that emphasizes the mitigation of impact toward one that proactively promotes biodiversity. Robert Montgomery, environmental specialist for the Bank's Private Sector Department (PRI) provided a list of Bank initiatives and commitments to safeguard its future investments in infrastructure from unnecessary risk. Some of these included the "capacity to say no" - or refuse problem projects, fortified monitoring and supervision systems, institutional strengthening measures where states are too weak to actually implement Bank safeguard policies, performance based contracts to institute positive sustainability incentives and transparent reporting standards. Most of these claims were provided with little or no evidence and went unchallenged in the panel discussion.
Marcelo Antinori, Coordinator of Plan Puebla Panamá and Region 2 division chief of infrastructure and finance, offered several claims about mega-infrastructure projects that he derived from thirty years of IFI and government experience. Antinori argued that without infrastructure, Latin American economies would not grow. Latin America can and should borrow from the IDB and others to build this infrastructure because the profitability of these investments is better than the prevailing interest rates. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the IDB should be involved in high risk infrastructure projects because the Bank's safeguards are stronger than most. He cited Plan Puebla Panamá as a medullar case of these axioms, acknowledging that while long-term mechanisms of civil society participation in PPP have been unsuccessful, the advice of civil society was effective in steering the IDB away from investment in hydroelectric dams along the Usumacinta River in Chiapas or the Patuca River of Honduras, or the Anillo Periferico in San Salvador. He pointed to a revision in the design of the Boruca dam, long opposed by Costa Ricans for its displacement of thousands of indigenous peoples and flooding of 10,000 hectares of sacred lands. The new proposed dam on the adjacent Veraguas River, which will likely be funded by the IDB, will only flood 5,400 hectares and displace no one. Finally, Antinori recognized criticisms about the link between infrastructure and inequality, but as in 2006, punted any serious debate about the central criticism of the prevailing integration model to some future discussion.
Mauro Marcondes, Coordinator of IIRSA, offered a conciliatory image of IIRSA as the consensus opinion of the twelve South American governments but was adapting to the recent political shifts in the region. As evidence of the evolution of IIRSA, Marcondes pointed to the participation of the Brazilian and Bolivian National Coordinators at Cochabamba social summit, special attention to strategic environmental assessment and a renewed effort to invite greater civil society involvement.
In the little time that was provided, several people quickly challenged some of the Bank's claims. While there may exist a majority consensus among the IFIs and many in Latin America about constructing mega projects, for example, highways, "a toda costa," some disagreed that this apparent consensus is adequately informed about the risks and benefit distribution associated with infrastructure mega-projects. Others contested that the IDB has had less to do than structural political shifts in the region with any evolution of the integration paradigm. It was also pointed out that the Bolivian National Coordinator resigned one month after his statements in Cochabamba. Comparing the three most significant Amazon highways built in recent years (the Peruvian Interoceanica with CAF funding, the Santarem-Cuiaba highway with Brazilian government funding and the Bolivian Corredor Norte with IDB and CAF funding) another participant argued that the Corredor Norte is perhaps the one that has the weakest environmental safeguards - raising questions about the certainty of IDB additionality. It might be added where the IDB has attempted to be most innovative in terms of attempting to set socio-environmental standards, as in the case of the highway Santa Cruz-Puerto Suarez, the poor results are now being used by Bank staff to lower social and environmental expectations.
The second panel reflected much better participants' expectations but was too ambitious in its scope. Although the themes dealt with were clearly interrelated, a division of the panel into subgroups would have allowed for more detailed explanations from Bank staff and some meaningful dialogue with CS participants. For example, the presentation by Stephen Zimmerman, Chief of the Office of Institutional Integrity could have provided some details of the work conducted by his office to date but was limited to a broad explanation of what it is set-up to do. Similarly, Janine Perfit of the State, Governance and Civil Society Division, indicated that a questionnaire had been conducted with country representatives on the CASCs but provided almost no details of the results. The moderator, Orlando Reos, and the panel members are due thanks for having extended the duration of the session by one hour but, with 50 participants and three themes to deal with, most questions inevitably went unanswered and there was no possibility of exploring further any of the themes which emerged. Two themes which were repeatedly raised by CS participants were the need to broaden participation in the CASC and the need to facilitate access to information for populations without access to the Internet. Greater discussion of the first of those themes could surely have provided some valuable inputs for the development of CASC regulations announced by Perfit.
The following three presentations of civil society "best practice" projects were of variable quality, somewhat disconnected to morning panels and reflective of experiences that added little value to key debates. Unfortunately, no attempt was made to draw out key lessons from these experiences which could inform future actions. This was particularly disappointing in the case of the Honduran CASC, given that it has been repeatedly cited as one of the best of the CASC and given the clear interest of civil society in making these bodies work in all 26 countries. The other two presentations, of the ACICAFOC indigenous ecosystem management, and a NGO based public health audit methodology, lacked any structural critique of the respective national or thematic contexts and were notably silent on meaningful results.
Encounter with President Moreno
President Moreno arrived and answered questions for and hour and a half to address about twenty five questions ranging from specific appeals for Bank contracts to a few broad policy questions related to minority participation in Bank processes to additionality. Few of the highest risk Bank projects (Camisea, Madeira) were raised directly, and Moreno gave few assurances beyond interest that anything would be done to address noted concerns or questions. It was disappointing that no attempt was made to structure this session. In consequence, it took on the feel of a "town hall meeting" where people could raise legitimate grievances and suggest ideas but with no order, no true dialogue and no process to follow-up on the issues subsequently.
Analysis of the Event
Overall, the most notable criticisms of the event included:
- The one day structure and poorly moderated event/panel process ignored past civil society suggestions that at least two days and trained moderators are needed to facilitate serious discussion.
- The first panel began with a civil society presentation (about social control mechanisms in Bolivia in the case of infrastructure or environment) that was neither relevant to nor of a quality that the topics merited. The presentation and associated interventions served more as a distraction than a stimulus for the proposed debates.
- The interventions by Bank representatives and Bank moderators in Panel 1 consumed at least half of the slotted time and made claims or referred to documentation that required far more time to explore than the panel was designed to accommodate. While essentially true for Panel 2 as well, extending the session for another hour reduced the proportion of time taken up by Bank staff closer to a third of the total.
- The moderation lacked the ability to maintain any continuity of the conversation and the rapporteur’s summary report didn't seem to reflect the weight of what came out from the participants. This is probably due in part to having to discuss too much in too little time with no useful structure.
- In general, the discussion focused more on aspirations or broad hypothetical claims rather than clear performance indictors. A perpetual debate about the existence or quality of Civil Society Advisory Councils (CASCs) tends to be based on anecdotal rather than systematic assessment criteria. Selective references to the Bank's information disclosure were hastily introduced by the Infrastructure panel Bank moderator, demonstrating not only an apparently weak grasp of the policy itself, but also a lack of experience as a moderator.
- Specifically on the issue of infrastructure, broad claims were made regarding the linkages between infrastructure, growth and poverty reduction that remain largely in the realm of theory but were treated in the panel as fact. Casual references to equity outcomes and participation in infrastructure mega-projects were presented by the IDB as low priority concerns.
- References to progress on recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel on environment (IDB website) were based on documentation that was provided late to the participants (Sustainability Review) or has not been made available for public review (Sustainability Index, Country Environmental Reports, and Strategic Environmental Assessments).
- The minutes for the 2006 meeting (IDB website) did not reflect feedback loops to IDB decision making processes, therefore resembling a laundry list of concerns and proposals with little indication of actual impact.
For many of these reasons, participants left the panel either confused about the goals of the event or frustrated about the disorganized and deficient planning.
Because some of these problems were forecast in the announcement of the event, many fewer people attended, particularly those that may have attended past meetings, thus greatly diminishing the richness and depth of the discussion. By a rough estimate, the ratio of Bank staff to meeting participants was about 1 to 2. Only two representatives from U.S. civil society attended. The Costa Rica Country Office representation was absent and the country CASC was notably silent, raising questions about the preferred venue. One could not help speculating whether the steadily dwindling numbers at these IDB sponsored civil society meetings were reflective of the Bank's larger concerns about its flagging relevance in the region.
Bank staff offered several responses to criticism of the event's planning and were evidently working under conditions not entirely of their choosing. Opposition among Bank staff to the inevitably poor timing and structure of the event was apparently over-ruled by higher authorities. Convenience for the Bank (coincidence with a planned meeting of the Central American governors in advance of the March annual meeting) was placed above actual utility.
A related rationale was the realignment process in which the uncertainty associated with pending management decisions that advised against attempting a more ambitious meeting
Another rationale for the panel structure was the balance that needs to be struck between civil society leaders with varying levels of engagement experience and knowledge about the Bank. Finally, the chronic lack of adequate funding to stage this type of exchange was a third factor to rationalize the missed opportunity in San José.
Perhaps by their absence, civil society leaders that have long engaged the IDB on fundamental policy issues are registering their doubts about their confidence in this dialogue process. However, it is at least as likely that the short duration of the meeting reduced their confidence in this specific instance of the dialogue and made it difficult to justify the expense (and carbon emissions) involved in going to Costa Rica for the day. In a direct exchange with President Moreno, one participant suggested that the deficiencies were so great that the Bank might consider turning the planning of any future civil society meeting to civil society. While it is unlikely that the Bank will be prepared to relinquish all control of the event, it is certainly true that unless civil society has a more formal role in the decision making process about logistics, themes and speakers, organized networks may begin to actively boycott the event.
Other related proposals to improve the quality of any future exchange with civil society included the visible and verifiable strengthening of country CASCs as a pre-requisite for defining the regional meeting agenda and level of participation. Pre-meetings convened by the Country office CASCs could serve as a vital coordinating mechanism to guide future discussion at a regional level.
Some issues deserve even greater preparation to achieve the desired quality of engagement with civil society at these annual meetings. Sub-regional thematic participatory mechanisms were viewed as increasingly necessary to facilitate meaningful exchange with civil society on regional issues such as IIRSA or Plan Puebla Panamá. If serious about these mechanisms, civil society organizations should advance substantive proposals with an eye to the March Annual Meeting in Guatemala (BIC web article). Finally, it was strongly recommended that the Bank prepare in future encounters to present either the results of previous commitments or at least a clear system of performance indicators of measuring progress.
A concrete proposal that combines both of these lines of argument above focuses on the lack any objective frame of reference for discussing the degree to which CASCs have been strengthened. The stated commitments by President Moreno in 2006 to have the CASCs function properly by July 2007 can only be measured by a systematic assessment of how these CASCs are operating in the view of Bank staff as well as civil society representatives. The IDB Civil Society unit has conducted a survey of CASCs, although civil society input on the actual design or implementation of the process was not solicited. The survey was announced in San José, but the results were not.
To have any credibility with civil society, a thorough analysis of CASC performance depends very much (like any survey) on the sample composition and the questions. A careful cross-section of civil society representatives in sampled countries is as essential as the wording of specific questions. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies are appropriate in this type of analysis, as well as an advisory board of external experts (given the very minimal staff within the Bank that has experience on participatory mechanisms. Co-management of the analysis by the IDB and civil society would greatly increase the validity of the results
The goals of such an analysis should be forward looking, both in terms of influencing the optimal incentive structure for Bank as a potential outcome of the ongoing realignment, as well as identifying best practices within the Bank and within civil society that go farthest toward fulfilling the potential of the CASCs. The fact that 12 Latin American borrowing members have recently had an election and are involved with early stages of the country strategy design also present a unique opportunity to explore the role of the CASC at a moment when it most matters.
Civil society participants left San José with many doubts about the future of Bank relations. Whether this tension will diminish or become more polarized depends on the capacity for civil society to offer concrete suggestions for preferable alternatives to the San José event as well as the substantive Bank action in response to those proposals.
Additional resources
- For the agenda, background presentations, and eventually, official minutes, visit the IDB web page