Numerous problems with the Mechanism’s functioning have become apparent through the cases that have been brought before it. Some key concerns:
Lack of transparency
One consistent problem with the Mechanism is a lack of transparency in its operations with project-affected peoples. For example, there is no timeline requirement for when the IIM must acknowledge the receipt of a claim or initiate the preliminary review process. The Bank has also failed to disclose information about who sits on the IIM’s Independent Roster of Experts, which is inconsistent with the practices of similar accountability mechanisms at other MDBs. In the few cases that have been processed by the IIM, there has been a dearth of communication with the claimants throughout the processes. For example, the Terms of Reference for the investigations of the Yacyretá and Termoeléctrica del Golfo projects were not disclosed to claimant groups, nor were they consulted on, nor were review process timelines made available to claimants. This lack of information inhibits claimant input or active participation in the inspection of their claim, which undermines the idea of an independent inspection.
Lack of clear timelines
The length of current IIM process, as illustrated by the completed cases, is unacceptable to complainants. The claimants for the Termoeléctrica del Golfo case waited over two years for Bank acknowledgment of their request for an investigation, and then even after approval of the investigation, notice did not go up on the IDB’s website for another six months. Furthermore, although the Panel report was completed in late February of 2003, it was not made available to claimants or the public until five months later. These delays are due in part to a process that has few timelines. For example, once a request for investigation is submitted, there is no deadline for the selection of a consultant to conduct the investigation, or for carrying out the initial eligibility assessment of the complaint. There is also no limit to the amount of time that the Board can spend deliberating the approval of an investigation.
Limited resources
The IIM does not have its own budget, and resources seem to be allocated only when needed for a specific activity. Currently, the IIM has no permanent staff and the Mechanism’s Coordinator works only part-time on IIM issues. The legal advisor responsible for evaluating the eligibility of requests is not exclusively assigned to IIM work and is unable to assess investigation requests in a timely manner due to other job responsibilities. The IIM’s Roster of Investigators is furthermore understaffed. The Roster is required to have 15 members from which panelists are selected when the Board approves an investigation. However, according to a Bank official there are currently no more than eight active members, which presents a serious capacity problem for processing multiple claims in a timely manner.
No enforcement capacity
The IIM has no authority to ensure implementation of corrective measures after an investigation is completed, which undermines its utility as an accountability tool. This problem was apparent in the Yacyretá case: although the Board of Directors approved measures intended to mitigate some of the negative impacts of the project in 1998, affected communities have not seen any results on the ground. As a result, they filed a new request for investigation in 2003.
How to file a claim
The official website for the IIM, which details rules and procedures, contact information, and information on the status of current investigations, can be found in English and Español. Parties seeking to activate the IIM process or ask questions about rules and procedures of filing a request must use the following address:
Inter-American Development Bank
Independent Investigation Mechanism
1300 New York Avenue, NW, Stop E-1205
Washington, DC 20577,
USA Tel. +1-202-623-1635; 202-623-3952
Fax +1-202-312-4057
The following criteria must be met for the IDB to consider a request for investigation legitimate.
- Requests can be filed by a community of persons—such as an organization, association, society, or other grouping of individuals—within an IDB borrowing-member country, whose rights or interests are likely to be directly and materially affected by the IDB’s failure to follow its operational policies. Requests can also be filed by a representative of an affected party.
- Requests must be presented in writing.
- Requests must indicate that the Bank has failed to follow or enforce its own operational policies or formally-adopted norms, and how that failure has caused, or is likely to cause, material harm to the affected party.
- The complaint must state all relevant facts, and include any evidence in the possession of the complaining party of the validity of its allegations, or indicate where that information can be obtained.
- The affected party must state what steps it has already taken to raise the problems with the Bank’s Management, and Management’s response to their concerns and/or allegations.
Tracking the Claim Process
|
| Time Frame |
Action Taken (after affected party files request for investigation, which is forwarded to the Coordinator) |
| No time limit |
The Coordinator notifies the affected party of receipt and, in consultation with the Legal Department, determines whether the request is in compliance with the requirements for applicability. |
|
No time limit |
If the request meets the eligibility requirements (specified above), the President will appoint an individual from the Roster as a consultant to review the request. |
|
Within 30 days |
If the consultant finds that the request is substantive and in accordance with the requirements to be considered, the Coordinator forwards it to Management who must respond within 30 days. |
|
No time limit |
The consulting member of the Roster evaluates Management’s response and other relevant information and sends his/her recommendation to the Coordinator, who sends it to the Board of Executive Directors. The affected party is notified when the request has been acknowledged by the Board of Executive Directors. |
|
No time limit |
The Board of Executive Directors decides whether to proceed with an investigation. |
|
Within 15 days |
The Coordinator notifies the affected party of the Board’s decision within 15 days after the decision is made. |
|
No time limit |
If an investigation is approved, the Coordinator gets in touch with Roster members whose skills/area of expertise are relevant to the case under investigation and sends a list of potential panelists to the President, who proposes three candidates for approval by the Board of Executive Directors and suggests the person that would preside over the Panel. At the same time, the Coordinator writes a draft Terms of Reference for the Investigation to be approved by the Board of Executive Directors. |
|
No time limit |
The panel conducts an investigation. The Coordinator provides the Panel with administrative support. |
|
No time limit |
The Panel presents its findings to the Board of Executive Directors and the President. |
|
Within 30 days |
Management prepares a response to the Panel’s report within 30 days of receiving it and presents it to the Board of Executive Directors. |
|
Within 90 days |
The Board evaluates the Panel’s findings and Management’s response. Both of these documents are made available to the public 90 days after they are received by the IDB Board. |
|
No time limit |
Management reports to the Board on implementation of corrective measures. |
|
No time limit |
The Board of Executive Directors evaluates and approves the corrective measures. |
|
Within 15 days |
Management’s report on implementation of corrective measures is sent to the affected party and is made available to the public within 15 days of it being presented to the Board. | |