In May 2002, Brazilian civil society organizations MAB (the Movement of Dam Affected People) and Rede Brasil filed a complaint before the IDB Independent Investigation Mechanism (IIM), citing IDB non-compliance with its own standards for environmental and social mitigation actions and participation of affected groups, among other things. In one of the most egregious examples of the inefficiency of the IIM, the initial eligibility review of the complaint was not initiated until nearly a year later, in April 2003.
This was only the first step in what has turned out to be a largely non-transparent investigation process. In late 2005, IIM investigators wrapped up their inspection of Cana Brava but, up to now, their full report has not been made available to the public. The IDB invoked the “confidentiality” sections of its revised Disclosure of Information policy in releasing only a 7-page summary of the report. This in spite of the Bank’s supposed presumption to disclosure and a provision in section III.C.5. of the policy that suggests that any confidential information included in an IIM report could be separated out into one or more annexes, which would be withheld from public circulation.
The IDB’s limited release of information around the Cana Brava investigation does not provide a sufficient basis for really understanding the various problems in the project, or what should be done to deal with them. Nevertheless, it was clear enough that the IIM found several aspects of the preparation and implementation of Cana Brava wanting. For example, IIM investigators concluded that the approval by IDB project managers of a “substantively incomplete” Resettlement Plan constituted a violation of the policy on Involuntary Resettlement (OP-710). They also reported critical “judgment errors” with respect to the acceptance of a census of displaced people that was deficient and of a compensation framework that did not acknowledge indirect project impacts on certain vulnerable groups. Finally, the investigators found project managers in violation of an Operations Programming policies (PR-204), for failing to heed recommendations made by the IDB Committee on Environmental and Social Impact (CESI) with regard to resettlement issues in the project. At the same time, the IIM report summary was completely silent on the flooding of Avás-Canoeiros lands and on other matters raised by the claimants. For more information, see the Abstract of Panel Report and IDB Management Response.
In February 2006, the IDB issued a press release addressing a Board-level discussion of the IIM report and the IDB management’s response to it. The release states that, in spite of the investigators’ findings on the violation of OP-710, “the Executive Directors were not able to reach consensus on whether the Bank’s Resettlement Policy was violated and, if such violation occurred, whether there were material adverse effects.” Project managers promised to pursue the IIM’s recommendations with regard to corrective measures in the implementation of Cana Brava, and there has been talk of establishing an economic and social development fund to address broader economic and social issues in the project impact area, possibly with the support of the IDB’s Multilateral Investment Fund. Meantime, the struggle in Brazil continues: in early April 2006 a number of people displaced by the Cana Brava dam participated in protest activities in the vicinity of the capital of Minas Gerais state, Belo Horizonte, where the April 2006 Annual Meetings of the IDB were taking place.